The Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) or in Indonesia known as "Perjanjian Promosi dan Perlindungan Penanaman Modal (P4M)" contains a very powerful dispute settlement mechanism that allows investors to file a lawsuit directly against a host country allegedly violating investment protection under international law. This is known as Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). The ability of investors to "impose" their rights directly against a country without the existence of an arbitration clause is considered as one of the extraordinary achievements of the BIT innovation. This paper discusses two types of dispute resolution models contained in almost all BITs signed by Indonesia, namely State-State Dispute Settlement (SSDS) and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). It also elaborates the weaknesses of the current dispute resolution formula, especially in the ISDS clause and provides the possibility of improvements to the formulation of the ISDS clause to better ensure a balance between the protection of foreign investors and the needs of the host country.
Introduction
In various countries, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are not always the same, but most of them contain many commitments or promises to protect the investment and investors of a country (investors) in the territory of another shortcomings in the existing BITs, 5 many countries including Indonesia have reviewed the existence of its BITs and been trying to make improvements to its BITs so that in the future, BITs can better meet the objectives of improving the welfare of the nation in the context of sustainable development.
In general, BITs provide two dispute settlement mechanisms, namely the settlement of disputes between States that signed BITs (State-State Dispute Settlement) and settlement of disputes between Investors from BITs' Signatory
Countries and other Countries where capital investment (Investor-Dispute Settlement) is carried out. The dispute settlement analysis in this paper focuses on the Investor-State dispute settlement mechanism.
State-to-State Dispute Settlement
Based on the results of a study of the 63 Indonesian BITs, InvestorState dispute settlement was not found in BIT with Canada, France and the United States. Dispute settlement with these three countries is in fact through the mechanism of State-State dispute settlement. The State-State dispute settlement provisions in BITs contain similar things, namely each dispute related to the interpretation or application of the provisions in the BITs or a claim that arises due to protected investment is settled diplomatically. However, there are slight differences in the formulation of the scope of disputes that can be resolved by the State-State mechanism listed in Canada and the United States' BITs with
France's BIT. In BITs with Canada and the United States, the dispute covers disputes due to differences in interpretation or application of BITs and also disputes that occur due to investment. While France's BIT only covers disputes due to differences in interpretation or application of BIT. 
State's Consent to Arbitration
One of the important things in Article 7 In the event that such a dispute cannot be settled amicably within six (6) months from the date of the written notification of such dispute, the investor may refer the dispute to either:
a. The courts of justice or administrative tribunals or agencies of competent jurisdiction of the Contracting Party that is a party to the dispute; or b. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter referred to as "the Centre").
[Malaysia]".
The consequence of Indonesia giving consent to pursue the InvestorState dispute settlement mechanism is that the agreement cannot be withdrawn unilaterally. In this case, the Host Country cannot hinder or prevent investors from filing lawsuits related to BIT against the Host Country. Indeed, this formulation provides more certainty to investors and makes the Investor-State dispute settlement mechanism to be effective, so as to strengthen the "promotion" function of a BIT.
Whereas in BIT between Indonesia and Malaysia, it appears that the formulation of consent by Indonesia is not expressed explicitly but can be interpreted from the words in the BIT. If observed, the provision does not explicitly state the agreement of the Parties to take the arbitration mechanism when in disputes. Consent is fulfilled if BIT allows foreign investors to submit a dispute to arbitration.
Amicable Settlement & Alternative Dispute Settlement
"Article 8 1. Any dispute between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party, concerning investment of the latter in the territory of the former, shall be settled amicably through consultations and negotiations.
[The Philippines]".
The BIT between Indonesia and the Philippines above contains provisions for conducting consultations and negotiations between the Parties to the dispute before the arbitration dispute settlement process or mechanism is taken. Based on the formulation of the above provisions, the BIT requires Indonesia and investors from the Philippines to take a method of consultation and negotiation first in an effort to resolve the dispute amicably. The condition for achieving maximum results from this process is active participation and good faith from the parties to the dispute. However, it must be understood that not all disputes can or are suitable to be resolved by means of a mediation or conciliation process. Most dispute settlement clauses use the format that dispute settlement starts with a non-confrontation settlement process, namely by negotiation and consultation. Then if the time has run out and a settlement of the investment dispute has not yet to be achieved, the foreign investor can bring the investment dispute to another forum specified in the BIT.
Conditions precedent to Arbitration
"Article 8 …Where an investor has submitted a dispute to the aforementioned competent tribunal of the Contracting Party where the investment has been made or to international arbitration, the choice shall be final.
[Argentina].
Article 9
If the dispute cannot thus be settled within a period of six months from the date on which the dispute has been raised by either Party, it may be submitted upon request of the investor (his choice will be final) either to… [Egypt] .
Submission of a dispute to domestic judicial procedures under paragraph 2 above shall not in any way affect the right of the nations concerned to submit the dispute to international arbitration or conciliation. [The Netherlands]".
If observed, there are differences between those three clauses above. The clause on BIT between Indonesia and Argentina and Egypt illustrates the obligation of Investors to choose between domestic and international arbitration. However, once the Investor initiates the proceedings at the domestic trial, he loses his right to take or file a lawsuit before arbitration, and vice versa. The purpose of this clause is to prevent multiple proceedings arising from the same legal facts or parallel proceedings.
11 If this happens, it will bring losses, especially for Indonesia because it will cost a lot of time and money. This approach is sometimes referred to as the "no U-turn" clause because although according to the clause the investor can take other legal remedies within a certain time, the clause only allows the plaintiff to go one way to Investor-State arbitration. This "no U-turn" clause should not be misunderstood by requiring investors to exhaust local remedies before submitting the dispute to arbitration. However, it
should also be noted that the formulation above reduces the interest of investors to use domestic/local justice.
While the third formula, namely in BIT with the Netherlands, is the opposite. The formula allows investors to, together, submit the same claim to two different forums, namely one taking the domestic/local court while the other taking the international arbitration mechanism. In some BITs, the State also requires that investors first take the domestic/local justice process to completion before they are entitled to the right to submit a dispute to international arbitration. This is known as "exhausted local remedies" as mentioned above. However, Indonesian BIT has no clause of this kind. Even the BIT between Indonesia and Belgium actually gives the parties the right to submit actions that are considered to violate the BIT to the ICSID without the need to complete all stages or administrative/domestic/local legal processes. At the present time, more and more BITs contain clauses that require the use of domestic/local legal measures to be completed before Investors submit a lawsuit to arbitration. Such clauses indeed, on one hand, encourage the use of domestic/local legal processes. However, on the other hand, although it depends on each country, it takes a long time before the Investor gets a decision and immediately takes the arbitration process. This will reduce the "attractiveness" of BITs for investors. As a middle ground, the use of domestic/local legal processes is still required in BITs and does not have to be completed for all of the stages but it is sufficient to set a period of time. 12 As already mentioned, that in the dispute settlement formulation in BITs signed by Indonesia there is no obligation for foreign investors to go to the domestic courts until completion (exhaustion of local remedies) therefore foreign investors are not obliged to resolve disputes through the domestic court; hence they can promptly submit any dispute to international arbitration. One of the important issues that come to developing countries' attention and various parties related to international arbitration decisions is the issue of disclosure (transparency), specifically referring to decisions made by the ICSID arbitral tribunal. Until now, ICSID itself has not taken steps to review its rules to be more transparent. However, this step has been carried out by UNCITRAL which currently has provisions regarding transparency.
13

Presentation of Claim
In each BIT, the State determines on whose behalf a claim can be submitted. Most Indonesian BITs determine that Investors can file a claim to arbitration in their own name. The formulation can be seen in some BITs below as follows.
"Article 11
In the event that such a dispute cannot be settled through consultations and negotiations, the investors in question may submit the dispute, for settlement:
[Australia]
Article 10 1. In the case of international arbitration, the dispute shall be submitted at the investor's choice, either to: [Argentina] Article 10 Investor can only file a claim in his own name unless the provisions in BIT also give him the authority to file a claim on behalf of a local company that he owns or controls. In BIT with Belgium, it is distinguished between "national" which refers to people (natural individuals) and "legal person" that refer to legal subjects with legal status (legal entity); whereas in BIT with the United Kingdom, the formula used is "national" or natural person and "company" which refers to legal entities.
Considering the development of legal cases related to investment disputes submitted to ICSID on the basis of BIT, it should also be considered in the case of concerning Investment. If an Investor is a shareholder of an Indonesian legal entity, the claim can be stated on the basis of, for example, the expropriation of his shares or the refusal of his right to obtain dividends. Therefore, to avoid a lawsuit based on these reasons, it is best to exclude these reasons or be excluded from the scope of the Investor-State dispute settlement.
Establishment of the Arbitration Tribunal
Based on the results of a study of the 63 BITs that Indonesia signed with Partner Countries, most of them did not contain the clause for the formation of the arbitral tribunal. As stated earlier, the 63 BITs have been categorized based on the type of dispute settlement "clause", and are divided into five major groups. Based on the grouping, most of the BITs only submit to the arbitration institution mentioned in BIT whether it refers to ICSID or UNCITRAL. This can be seen from BIT with the Netherlands (group 2) which does not contain the Investor-State dispute settlement clause especially the arbitration tribunal's clause. Furthermore BIT with Belgium (group 3), Malaysia and Sweden (group 4), and England (group 5). This is different in BIT with China which includes a clause concerning the formation of an arbitral tribunal, as follows. "Article 9 3. The ad hoc tribunal shall be constituted for each individual case in the following way: each party shall appoint an arbitrator, and these two shall select a national of a third state which has diplomatic relations with the two Contracting Parties as Chairman, the first two arbitrators shall be appointed within two months of the written notice for arbitration by either party to the other, and the Chairman be selected within four months. If within the period specified above, the tribunal has not been constituted; either party to the dispute may invite the Secretary-General of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes to make the necessary appointments.
The tribunal shall determine its own procedure. However, the tribunal may, in the course of determination of procedure, take as guidance the Arbitration Rules of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes… [China]".
If in BITs there are no rules regarding the appointment of arbitrators, the arbitrators will be appointed by referring to the procedure contained in the arbitration rules. The way to appoint the arbitrators differs between ICSID rules and UNCITRAL rules. According to ICSID, the parties to the dispute appoint one arbitrator each and then they (the parties) jointly appoint one more arbitrator as chairman; whereas according to UNCITRAL, the parties to the dispute appoint one arbitrator each and the two arbitrators appointed are those who will appoint one more arbitrator as the leader of the arbitrator.
In addition, all Indonesian BITs do not contain clauses regarding arbitrator qualifications and rules regarding fees or remuneration for arbitrators. Even though this needs to be considered to limit the risk of the Host Country especially in terms of costs that must be paid to the arbitrators. This issue is one of the concerns of developing countries in the 7 th Annual Forum of Developing Country Investment Negotiators held in Jakarta on 4-6 November 2013.
Consolidated-claim
The consolidation clause was first included in the 2004 United States BIT
Model which aims to avoid multiple lawsuits simultaneously (parallel), encourage faster and more affordable costs of decisions on consolidation claims, and avoid inconsistent results in several claims originating from the same actions or measures.
14 Given that most of the BITs signed by Indonesia were carried out almost a decade ago and even more, the clause of the consolidation lawsuit was not found in all of the BITs. Consolidation is the act of combining or merging and completing in one arbitral tribunal several disputes or claims submitted separately but actually still related. This will result in a more efficient arbitration ruling and can help prevent the potential for different and even conflicting decisions from some of the claims originating from the same measure. Indeed, most BITs, not only Indonesia, do not contain this kind of clause.
In addition to the consolidation lawsuit, the Indonesian BITs have not yet included a clause on a "frivolous claim" as well as an attempt or retaliatory action from the Host Country, namely a counter-claim. For example, Columbia in its BIT has included this clause which states that if an investment company is proven to have committed corruption, it has no right to sue the government or it can sue, but the number of damages proposed must be reduced.
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Remedies
Based on the results of the reviews on the 63 Indonesian BITs, no provision of remedies is found in dispute settlement clauses. The approach that does not include the provisions of remedies effort is indeed an approach that is mostly carried out in most BITs. However, the absence of such a clause will give substantial discretion to the arbitral tribunal to determine what remedies will be given in the arbitral award according to their opinion.
In general, efforts to remedies in the process of Investor-State dispute settlement can be in the form of financial (pecuniary) and non-financial (non- pecuniary). Non-financial remedies are usually in the form of asset recovery, meaning that the arbitral tribunal orders the respondent to return certain assets to the claimant, for example in the case of expropriation. In addition, it can also take the form of an order to revoke, cancel or change provisions or actions that have legislative, administrative or even legal product or rules.
Finality and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
As well as several clauses that have not been found in Indonesian BITs, clauses about finality and enforcement of arbitral awards are also not found in those 63 Indonesian BITs. However, some BITs contain clauses that reaffirm that the arbitral award binds the parties and requires the State to ensure its implementation (execution). This means that provisions/laws must be established and the local institution will implement the international arbitral award, and the Host Country may not prevent the execution of the decision. In addition, the implementation of the arbitral award itself is governed by the provisions of the ICSID stating that the arbitral award must be treated as a final decision from the domestic/national court. The same thing is also regulated in UNCITRAL rules.
In Indonesia, since the enactment of Law No. 30 of 1999 concerning Arbitration and Alternative Disputes Settlement, the question of whether foreign or international arbitral awards can be implemented in Indonesia has been answered. According to the Law, foreign or international arbitration decisions can be executed in Indonesia by first requesting a determination from the Central Jakarta District Court.
16
Conclusion
In general, for the interests of Indonesia, which becomes one of the objectives of foreign investment, the dispute settlement clause between foreign investors and the host country is not an advantage because this clause is the result of the effort of the exporting country of foreign investors to protect investors from their country. 17 On the other hand, with the existence of the clause, the Host Country allows foreign Investors to directly file a claim to international arbitration in the event of investment disputes.
18
According to Mahnaz Malik, the Host Country has little chance to "win" in a lawsuit brought to international arbitration. Winning in international arbitration, according to him, is when the investor's claim is rejected by the arbitral tribunal so that the Host Country does not need to pay compensation to the Investors. But the Host Country still has to pay court fees in the international arbitration process using the Host Country's money.
19
The absence of Investor-State dispute settlement clause means that there is no direct agreement between the host country and foreign investors to submit disputes to international arbitration. 20 With no agreement from the host country, foreign investors cannot bring the host country to international arbitration using BIT.
21
The development of BITs over the past few decades shows the trend of the review of the existence of BITs in almost all developing countries. Given that almost all BITs were signed around four or five decades ago, the notion that the clauses contained in BIT focus more on protection for investors, and the absence of clauses designed to ensure economic growth and development in the Host Country, is true. 22 Therefore, at present the main need in conducting BIT reviews by various countries, including Indonesia, is on one hand, ensuring that BITs to be made in the future, if deemed necessary, should provide greater clarity between the standards of protection for investors that have existed, and on the other hand, dismissing that the development goals can or should be realized in BIT clauses in the future, especially in the Investor-State dispute settlement mechanism clause.
